

THE EXPENDITURE BENCHMARK: COMPLEX AND UNSUITABLE FOR INDEPENDENT FISCAL INSTITUTIONS

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The Expenditure Benchmark: complex and unsuitable for Independent Fiscal Institutions

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Abstract

The Expenditure Benchmark (EB) is an indicator for the evolution of public expenditure, introduced in 2011 in the already complex European fiscal rules framework. Its application has been increasingly promoted by the European Commission, and most existing proposals to reform the EU fiscal rules aim to keep it. However, the EB is not a substitute for the structural balance, not only because it requires the latter as an input, but also because the EB calculation demands some of the unobservable variables heavily criticised in the structural balance. The EB indicator is quite complex and not suitable for the use at national level by the Independent Fiscal Institutions – that monitor compliance with national fiscal rules – as it relies on the European Commission’s data inputs and judgement not available in real-time. This paper argues for more transparency and for a simplification of this indicator to reduce the reliance on non-observable variables.

Resumo

O *Expenditure Benchmark* (EB) é um indicador da evolução da despesa pública introduzido em 2011 no já bastante complexo enquadramento de regras orçamentais europeias. A sua utilização tem sido cada vez mais promovida pela Comissão Europeia e a maioria das propostas apresentadas para reformar as regras orçamentais da UE visam mantê-lo. No entanto, o EB não é um substituto para a regra do saldo estrutural, não só porque o saldo estrutural é necessário enquanto input, mas também porque o cálculo do EB necessita de algumas das variáveis não observáveis que tanto foram criticadas no saldo estrutural. O indicador do EB é bastante complexo e não adequado para a utilização a nível nacional pelas Instituições Orçamentais Independentes que verificam o cumprimento das regras orçamentais nacionais, uma vez que se baseia em dados e no julgamento da Comissão Europeia, que não se encontram disponíveis em tempo real. Este texto defende uma maior transparência e uma simplificação deste indicador para reduzir a sua dependência de variáveis não observáveis.

Keywords: Expenditure benchmark; Independent Fiscal Institutions; EU fiscal rules; Stability and Growth Pact.

JEL: E61; E02; E62; H50; H61

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1 Introduction


The expenditure benchmark (EB) was introduced by the 2011 six-pack reform to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in response to the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. Its purpose was to overcome some of the shortcomings of the structural budget balance (SBB) calculation, which is an indicator based on a non-observable variable subject to frequent revisions. The EB was supposed to provide “more operational guidance to the Member States in the conduct of prudent fiscal policies, by focusing surveillance on indicators directly under the control of the government.” (see the Communication from the European Commission [COM\(2020\) 55 final](#), Box 1). Over time the Commission has been making the case for a more prominent role for the EB in both the preventive and the corrective arm of the SGP.² More recently, several proposals to reform the economic governance of the euro area aim to give to the EB an even stronger role in the rules-based European fiscal framework.

This paper contributes to the discussion on the usefulness of the EB for policy surveillance, concluding that the current design of the EB is not fit to serve all purposes it was created for. Overall, the EB: 1) is not an operational indicator directly under the control of the government; 2) still relies on non-observable variables and on data inputs that are not readily available; 3) it is not fully consistent with the structural balance by design; 4) the Commission has almost full discretion regarding the classification of Discretionary Revenue Measures that are netted-out from its calculation; 5) it is very complex to calculate and to replicate, and thus not suitable to monitoring by national Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs) in real-time, being also very difficult to communicate to the public.

There is already some evidence of the EB’s design flaws: not a single significant deviation procedure was launched due to non-compliance with the EB, despite some euro area member states showed deviations from the required benchmark larger than the significance threshold, even after some had-hoc changes in the calculation of the benchmark itself by the Commission (see (European Fiscal Board, 2018, 2019)). Still according to the European Fiscal Board (EFB), in the case of Latvia, Portugal and Slovakia, although the overall assessment based on the structural balance and the expenditure benchmark pointed to a significant deviation in 2018, the Commission concluded that there was “no sufficient ground to conclude on the existence of an observed significant deviation” by referring to a number of factors beyond the reading of the two numerical indicators (European Fiscal Board, 2019, pp. 27–28). Figure 1 summarizes the main problems with the EB.

² The [Code of Conduct on the Stability and Growth Pact](#) now includes the Opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee on “Improving the predictability and transparency of the SGP: A stronger focus on the expenditure benchmark in the preventive arm”, and the Opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee on “Improving the assessment of effective action in the context of the excessive deficit procedure – A specification of the methodology”, both endorsed by the Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) Council on 6 December 2016.

Figure 1 – Summary of the Expenditure Benchmark problems



2 The concept of the Expenditure Benchmark

Introduced in the reform package of 2011 the EB was supposed to complement the structural balance indicator overcoming its shortcomings. The structural balance is a non-observable variable of the underlying budget balance that would be obtained if the economy were at its full production potential. It is an interesting theoretical concept that allows distinguishing the discretionary fiscal measures from the working of the automatic stabilisers, therefore assessing the fiscal stance. However, in practice, the calculation of the structural balance requires several (strong) assumptions to estimate the economic cycle and its impact on the budget balance. As a result, the structural balance estimates are frequently revised, which has led to an increasing criticism on its use for fiscal surveillance purposes. Some of its critics advocate a fiscal rule that is simpler to calculate and operationalise, inter alia an expenditure rule.³

There are several advantages of a well-designed expenditure rule, as exposed by the (IMF, 2014) and (Bedogni & Meaney, 2017): it helps containing the expenditure growth to values consistent with a sustainable debt trajectory; it is counter-cyclical, “shielding” expenditure from cyclical revenue fluctuations; allows the anchoring of medium-term fiscal frameworks; and, are enforceable and predictable as an expenditure rule maps directly into the formulation of the annual budget. However, to present such benign features several pre-conditions must be fulfilled in the form of adequate public finance management (Cangiano et al., 2013), adequate institutions, proper design to counter-act some disadvantageous effects and, as stressed by the (IMF, 2014), “fundamental genuine commitment of policymakers to sound and high-quality public finances.”

An expenditure rule has its disadvantages, including a political incentive to preserve some low-quality projects with short-term political dividends at the expense of higher-quality programmes with long-term productive benefits – as is the case of productive public investment. Another limitation is that a spending rule by itself does not take into account the ability of the revenue system to withstand a (large) negative shock. So an expenditure rule could be complemented by other rules. (Bedogni & Meaney, 2017) make the point that “a revenue rule, where greater than expected revenues could be set aside for either a contingency fund or for investment in capital projects, would adequately complement the expenditure rule and ensure there are savings to deal with future shocks.”

At the present, several rules are in force in the European Union (EU) applying to public debt and deficit. The SBB rule requires the EU Member States to reach a country-specific Medium-Term Objective (MTO) defined in terms of the structural balance. The adjustment path followed towards the MTO requires an annual fiscal adjustment that is modelled taking into account the economic cycle, the debt level and the sustainability needs according to a matrix of requirements incorporated into the [Code of Conduct on the SGP](#). The expenditure benchmark was devised as a complementary instrument to the SBB for countries to reach or stay at the MTO: the relevant net expenditure should grow

³ For instance (Andrle et al., 2015) discuss a single fiscal anchor with a single operational rule, being an expenditure rule one of the candidates for the operational rule.

in line with the reference potential growth rate when at the MTO or grow by less than that rate if the country is not yet at the MTO. The assessment of compliance of the preventive arm of the SGP looks at both the structural balance and the EB.⁴

2.1 The calculation of the benchmark

The EB applies to a modified public expenditure aggregate that excludes interest expenditure, expenditure on EU programmes fully matched by EU funds revenue, and the cyclical element of unemployment benefit expenditure. This directly follows the definition in the SGP Regulation.⁵ In addition, the nationally financed government investment is averaged over four years to smooth the impact of any large investment projects. Besides, when assessing compliance with the EB, the impact of one-off measures is systematically corrected for.⁶ The government size among EU Member States is highly heterogeneous – ranging from 25% to 55% expenditure-to-GDP ratios – so the EB could not constrain countries with a low expenditure ratio from increasing it, as long as such increase is financed by additional revenue (therefore not threatening sustainability). As a result, the modified expenditure aggregate is subtracted from discretionary revenue measures (DRM) and revenues mandated by law (RML) before it is compared with the reference rate, which leads to the net modified expenditure aggregate (net of DRM). The DRM enter this calculation also net of the (annual) change in the use of one-offs on the revenue side of the budget.⁷ The steps for the calculation of the net expenditure growth (nominal) adjusted from one-offs are presented in Box 1.

⁴ Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 (as amended) states that: “Sufficient progress towards the medium-term budgetary objective shall be evaluated based on an overall assessment with the structural balance as the reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures.”

⁵ According to the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97, “The expenditure aggregate shall exclude interest expenditure, expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by Union funds revenue and non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefit expenditure.”

⁶ At the start of the application of the EB there was no correction for one-offs, which was a source of conflict with the SBB analysis when there were sizable one-offs (see (Bedogni & Meaney, 2017) for the case of Ireland).

⁷ This calculation uses the change and not the level of one-offs because the EB ultimate objective is to calculate a “corrected” variation rate of expenditure, and not a “corrected” expenditure level.

Box 1 – Steps in the calculation of the net expenditure growth (nominal) adjusted from one-offs

For a determined year t :

Step 1

Modified expenditure aggregate in t (MG_t) = General Government Expenditure in t – Interest Payments in t – Government expenditure on EU programmes fully matched by EU funds revenue in t – Nationally financed gross fixed capital formation in t + Annual average of nationally financed gross fixed capital formation from $t-3$ to t – Cyclical unemployment expenditure in t – One-offs expenditure in t

Step 2

Calculation of the incremental impact for year t of discretionary revenue measures having an incremental effect on revenues collected in t with respect to $t-1$ adjusted for one-offs (ΔR_t). The adjustment for one-offs requires subtracting the annual change in revenue side one-offs.⁸

$$\Delta R_t = DRM_t + RML_t - \Delta \text{One-offs Revenue}_t$$

Step 3

Net expenditure growth rate (mg) for year t : $mg_t = (MG_t - \Delta R_t - MG_{t-1}) / MG_{t-1} - 1$

Source: Based on (European Commission, 2019), Box 1.11.

The net expenditure growth rate is compared with the appropriate reference rate both in nominal and real terms. This is the medium-term growth rate of potential GDP, calculated as a ten-year average comprising five years of backward-looking data, the year underway and four years of forward-looking data (*i.e.*, four years of forecasts).

As already mentioned, for countries not yet at the MTO the net expenditure must grow less than the potential reference rate to ensure convergence to the MTO. This is achieved by subtracting a “recalibrated convergence margin” to the potential GDP growth. According to the (European Commission, 2019), “the convergence margin is calculated based on the assumption that any decrease in the share of public expenditure that is not financed by additional revenue measures (which would occur if net expenditure grows more slowly than GDP) would lead to an exactly proportional improvement of the structural balance (the coefficient being equal to the share of public expenditure in GDP times the shortfall of expenditure growth). Therefore, the size of the convergence margin depends on the size of the general government sector, with larger public sectors requiring less expenditure restraint in percentage terms to yield a particular tightening of the structural budget”. The convergent margin can be quite large, increasing with the

⁸ The calculation also includes the revenue increase mandated by law. For the sake of simplicity, since they are not very common and are subject to the same treatment of DRM, the remaining of the text will not make an explicit reference to them.

distance from the structural balance to the MTO and decreasing with the expenditure ratio.⁹

Both the potential GDP growth and the convergence margin for year t are set based on the European Commission Spring forecast made in year $t-1$ and are kept “frozen” until its assessment in the Spring of year $t+1$. As both are defined in real terms and the expenditure is at current prices, the GDP deflator for year t from the $t-1$ Spring Commission forecast is used.

To ensure consistency with the structural balance pillar the so-called flexibility clauses are also taken into account (meaning netted out): structural reforms, pension reform, investment clause, refugee and security, and “other unusual events”.

2.2 Conciliation with the structural balance rule

It is possible to derive a structural primary expenditure growth consistent with a given structural balance change (as demonstrated in the Annex). Based on (Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, 2015) the growth rate of structural primary expenditure is given by:

$$\frac{d(PE)}{PE} = g + \frac{d(SDEF/Y)}{PE/Y} + \frac{d(R/Y) - d(rB/Y)}{PE/Y}, \quad (1)$$

where PE is the structural primary expenditure, Y is the potential GDP and g its growth rate, $SDEF$ is the structural deficit, R is structural revenue and r is the implicit interest rate on public debt (B).

The EB framework could be written as implying:

$$mg_t = \bar{g} - \frac{-d(SDEF_t^{req}/Y_t)}{PE_{t-1}^{obs}/GDP_{t-1}}, \quad (2)$$

since for the Member States not at their respective MTO the growth rate of the modified (primary) expenditure aggregate net of one-offs and DRM (mg_t) should equal the reference medium-term potential growth (\bar{g}) less the convergence margin, which is calculated as the annual required improvement in the structural balance (*i.e.*, the symmetric of the structural deficit) in percentage points of GDP – in this notation $-d(SDEF_t^{req}/Y_t)$ – divided by the observed primary expenditure (PE^{obs}) to GDP ratio in the previous year.

Confronting the two expressions above we can conclude that the EB framework could give rise to different results from the application of the structural balance (improvement) rule due to several factors, namely:

⁹ The convergence margin for year t is obtained dividing the required tightening (in the structural balance) in percentage points of GDP by the share of government primary expenditure in GDP in year $t-1$, using as source the values from the Spring forecast (published in $t-1$). For Member States at their MTO, the convergence margin is by construction set to zero. A negative value is not calculated for countries that have overachieved their MTO. The following section shows how the convergence margin should be calculated in order to ensure consistency with the SBB.

- i. The reference medium-term rate for potential output growth (\bar{g}) used in the EB might differ from the current year potential output growth that would be consistent with the structural balance rule (g_t). Such divergence was clearly visible in the post-sovereign debt crisis data because the reference rate was still influenced by lower potential growth during the crisis years while there was a rebound in current potential output growth.
- ii. Revenue changes not induced by DRM or by the cyclical developments, as it is the case of the revenue windfalls or shortfalls that impact on the SBB.
- iii. Significant changes in interest payments to GDP ratio, due to large swings in the implicit interest rate on debt, could originate a windfall (when there is a sharp decrease in the ratio of interest payments) or a shortfall, on the reverse case, in the calculation of the SBB.
- iv. Specificities in the calculation of the modified expenditure aggregate for the EB framework:¹⁰
 - a. To be completely consistent with the structural balance rule the EB should be based on the structural primary expenditure, which according to the EU's commonly agreed methodology is obtained by subtracting the cyclical component of the expenditure to the primary expenditure ratio.¹¹ However, the EB subtracts a cyclical unemployment expenditure that is calculated differently and could even show an opposite sign (see below).
 - b. Also to ensure consistency, the convergence margin for the EB should be calculated dividing the required adjustment by the ratio of structural primary expenditure to potential GDP, and not by the observed primary expenditure ratio to GDP.
 - c. The EB considers an average of domestically financed investment while for the structural balance it is the total current investment that matters.

Divergent readings from the SBB and the EB lead to the need of an overall assessment to determine whether there is a significant deviation from the requirements, which further complicates the communication of the assessment of the fiscal rules.

¹⁰ The other adjustments in the calculation of the modified expenditure aggregate, such as the removal of expenditure financed by EU funds are necessary to ensure consistency since such funds are neutral to the budget balance; the same applies to the adjustment for one-offs, which are also removed for the calculation of the structural balance.

¹¹ The cyclical component of the expenditure is obtained multiplying the output gap by the semi-elasticity of the expenditure to the cycle. Only unemployment-related expenditures are assumed to react to the economic cycle.

3 Continued reliance on non-observables

Due to the original conception of the EB as a complementary tool to the structural balance pillar and the need to ensure consistency between the two pillars of the SGP's preventive arm the EB continues to rely on much the same unobservable variables that have led to the criticism of the structural balance.¹²

3.1 Structural balance and the MTO

For the operation of the EB, to determine the convergence margin it is necessary to know whether a given country has already reached the respective MTO or not, which is defined in structural terms. Therefore, the working of the EB is still reliant on the structural balance calculation and not a substitute for it.

3.2 Potential GDP

The potential GDP necessary to find the medium-term reference rate for the EB is an unobservable variable derived from the Commonly Agreed Methodology, which is at the centre of the criticism for the calculation of the structural balance.¹³ It might be argued that such rate is more stable than the output gap indicator used in the yearly calculation of the structural balance, as it is a ten-year moving average of the potential output growth rates, which, in turn, are more stable than the level. However, the calculation is still quite sensitive to the latest forecast available because of the use of forward-looking (forecast) data inputs and to the method used to estimate the potential output. The (European Commission, 2020) purposes the moving average of actual GDP growth rates as a possible modelling alternative. Yet, if a given country is experiencing a declining trend in GDP growth, the use of past data could lead to a very loose expenditure constraint. This shortcoming could be overcome by also including GDP growth forecasts in the computation.

3.3 Cyclical unemployment expenditure

The EB indicator removes the “cyclical unemployment expenditure” as it is one of the components of expenditure that is not in the direct control of the policymaker. For this the following formula is used:

$$\text{Cyclical UnExp}_t = \text{UnExp}_t * \frac{UR_t - NAWRU_t}{UR_t}, \quad (3)$$

¹² It must be recognized that there are indeed few truly observed macroeconomic aggregates, even the GDP statistic relies on some extrapolation. However, there is a clear distinction between the measurement error of statistical variables and that of variables that can be estimated by means of different methodologies with very different outcomes – such as the potential output.

¹³ The medium-term potential GDP growth rate applied to set the requirements for year t is calculated based on the Commission Spring forecast in $t-1$ and kept “frozen” until the assessment of compliance in May of year $t+1$.

where the cyclical unemployment compensation expenditure is a function of the total unemployment compensation expenditure (*UnExp*) and of the excess in the unemployment rate (*UR*) vis-à-vis the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (*NAWRU*), another unobservable variable that enters the toolkit for the estimation of the structural balance.¹⁴ Consequently, when the unemployment rate is above the *NAWRU* part of the unemployment compensation expenditure is subtracted from the expenditure aggregate subject to the EB.

However, this formulation does not ensure consistency with the structural balance calculation. To calculate the structural balance, it is necessary to remove the cyclical component of the budget balance using the Commonly Agreed Methodology. This is a two-steps approach that requires the estimation of the output gap in the first step, and then the multiplication of such output gap by the semi-elasticities of government revenue and expenditure to output in the second step. The semi-elasticity of the government expenditure ultimately depends on the elasticity of the unemployment compensation expenditure to the output gap, as the methodology assumes that the elasticity of other expenditures to the output gap is zero.¹⁵ As such semi-elasticity is negative for all Member States, when the output gap is negative the cyclical component of expenditure is positive: during bad economic times the expenditure-to-GDP ratio increases reflecting the work of the automatic stabilisers – the increase of unemployment compensation expenditure leaving unchanged the other expenditure. In the case of the EB framework, the cyclical unemployment expenditure is positive when the unemployment rate exceeds the *NAWRU*.

There would be consistency with the structural balance pillar if whenever the output gap is negative the unemployment rate also surpasses the *NAWRU*, *i.e.* when they show opposite signs.¹⁶ However, this is not always the case as the *NAWRU* is just one element of the production function used to derive the potential output (and ultimately the output gap).¹⁷ As a matter of fact, using the Spring 2020 Commission forecast between 2000 and 2019 for the 27 Member States and the UK there is a divergence between the sign of the cyclical component of government expenditure and the sign of the cyclical unemployment expenditure in ¼ of the observations (143 cases in 559 combinations).¹⁸ For instance, during the last upswing, for Germany in 2016 and 2017, the output gap was

¹⁴ The estimation of the *NAWRU* is problematic in real-time and prone to pro-cyclicality at the sample end, especially in the neighbourhood of turning points that recent methodological changes have tried to minimize (see (Planas et al., 2017)).

¹⁵ The semi-elasticity of General Government expenditure is given by the product of the expenditure-to-GDP ratio by its elasticity with respect to the output gap, which in turn is given by the elasticity of the unemployment compensation expenditure to the output gap times the share of unemployment related expenditure on total government expenditure less the unity. See (Mourre et al., 2014) for details.

¹⁶ During bad times, captured by a negative output gap, full consistency would imply a positive cyclical component of government expenditure to calculate the structural balance and a positive cyclical unemployment expenditure to use in the EB calculation.

¹⁷ See (Havik et al., 2014) for details on the production function used to derive the potential GDP and the output gap.

¹⁸ In the case of the UK and Spain the two measures have always consistent readings. Finland, Sweden, and the Czech Republic show the higher number of years when there are inconsistencies (9 years); Belgium, Croatia, Hungary, Malta, Romania immediately follow with 8 years.

reported as positive, leading to a negative cyclical component of expenditure, while the EB cyclical unemployment was positive (Table 1).¹⁹

The differences are not very large and eventually compensate each other over time. However, the introduction of such an unobservable component hinders the operationalization of the benchmark without even ensuring consistency with the SBB. Since the purpose of the EB is to ultimately reach a reference growth rate rather than a reference level for the expenditure, it is difficult to understand the need to explicitly model the cyclical unemployment expenditure, since the unemployment expenditure is a small part of total expenditure. Yet, this would remove any adjustment for the economic cycle. Alternatively, it would be much simpler to just remove all unemployment compensation expenditure or a deviation from a simple moving average. There would be simplicity gains without much loss of cyclical adjustment properties, as, in practice, the NAWRU follows narrowly the observed unemployment rate.

Table 1 – Different signs between EB “cyclical unemployment expenditure” and SBB “cyclical component of government expenditure”

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Belgium	1	1	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0
Czechia	1	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	1
Germany	1	1	0	0
Estonia	1	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0
France	0	1	0	0
Croatia	1	1	0	0
Italy	0	0	1	0
Cyprus	1	1	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	1	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0
Malta	1	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0
Austria	0	1	0	0
Poland	1	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	1	0	0
Slovakia	1	0	0	0
Finland	0	1	1	1
Sweden	1	0	0	0
United Kingdom	0	0	0	0

Note: 1 signals an inconsistent sign, and zero a consistent sign.

¹⁹ The same happens in the case of Finland for the period 2017-2019 and for other countries.

3.4 Discretionary Revenue Measures (DRM)

Whenever a government is willing to raise taxes to finance a spending increase it does not add, *ceteris paribus*, to debt sustainability concerns. Consequently, as the EB focus only on the expenditure side of the budget, it is necessary to allow for increases in expenditure explicitly financed by discretionary tax increases. Otherwise, it would be impossible to increase the expenditure-to-GDP ratio when complying with the EB. However, in practice, there are several data availability and measurement issues regarding discretionary revenue measures, as is recognized by the (European Commission, 2020). These issues are aggravated for IFIs, that are outside of the official circle comprising the national authorities and the Commission.


In practice, Euro-area Member States are compelled to include in the Draft Budget Plan (DBP) for year t (submitted by 15 of October $t-1$) a table stating the total DRM and the amounts to be excluded from the EB. It is an aggregate figure expressed in percentage of GDP. It is also required to list the discretionary measures taken by the General Government. The Commission makes a judgment about it, which is not public. In November $t-1$ the Commission publishes the Autumn Forecast (AF), which includes an aggregate figure for the DRM on current revenue and capital transfers received. The assessment of compliance with the EB is made in the Spring of $t+1$, using the Spring Forecast (SF) data. There is no breakdown of the final SF data on DRM (apart from the distinction between total current and capital revenue DRM) and there is a complete lack of transparency regarding how the final figures are obtained since there isn't any known published source for the data.

Table 2 shows for a selection of countries with a higher amount of DRM in 2019 the different figures published over time: the amount identified by the national authorities in the DBPs submitted in October 2018; the first assessment by the Commission in the AF/2018; and the final figures for 2019 from the SF/2020, on which the assessment of compliance is based.²⁰ When comparing the initial DBP reporting with the assessment data there is a large difference in the case of Cyprus, France, Latvia, and Luxemburg. In absolute terms, such difference is equal or larger than the margin for a significant deviation (0.5% of GDP), which means that the size of DRM might be sufficient by itself to make a difference between compliance and a significant deviation from the requirements of the preventive arm of the SGP.²¹ It is also noteworthy that for the case of Latvia and Luxemburg there is a change in the sign of the DRM: while the authorities reported tax increases in their DBP, in the end, tax cuts were applied.

²⁰ Portugal is also included in the sample despite not showing a high DRM amount.

²¹ The deviation is considered significant when it has a total impact on the government balance of at least 0.5% of GDP in a single year or cumulatively in two consecutive years.

Figure 1 – Difference between DRM outturn in 2019 (SF/2020) and reported DRM in DBP/2019 (in p.p. of GDP)



Notes: See Table 2.

Table 2 – selected DRM for the year 2019 (% of GDP)

	DBP/2019 2018/10	AF/2018 2018/11	SF/2020 2020/05	Difference SF-DBP
Belgium	-0.2	-0.3	-0.7	-0.5
Cyprus	0.4	0.4	1.5	1.1
France	-0.2	-0.9	-1.1	-0.9
Latvia	0.2	-0.5	-0.5	-0.7
Luxembourg	0.3	-0.3	-0.4	-0.7
Netherlands	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.0
Portugal	-0.2	-0.4	-0.2	0.0

Source of data: national DBP for 2019, submitted by October 15, 2018; European Commission's Autumn Forecast 2018 (AF/2018), and Spring Forecast 2020 (SF/2020), codes 1.0.319.0.UDMGCR "discretionary measures current revenue: general government" plus 1.0.319.0.UDMGKTR "discretionary measures capital transfers received: general government".

4 Other data problems and adjustments

4.1 EU funds

The EB excludes the expenditure financed by the EU funds since such expenditure is neutral for the budget balance. It is, however, hard to obtain accurate information in real-time on such flows of financing. Given the operational complexity of structural funds, it is difficult to forecast the transfer of funds from the EU budget.

4.2 Investment

The EB considers a moving average of four years for the nationally financed investment instead of the actual investment in year t . According to the (European Commission, 2020), this smoothing of public investment is “to protect the sustainable part of public investment” or, in another formulation, “to protect the non-excessive part of public investment”. Therefore, only when the investment in a given year is higher than in the previous three it penalizes the EB, while an investment cut is not immediately fully reflected into a lower spending aggregate. However, when a large variation in investment occurs, this treatment is a source of inconsistency with the rules applying to the budget balance, to the structural budget balance, and to the debt that only considers the actual investment (and the respective financing needs) in year t .

5 The IFIs’ role in the EB

The 2012 Fiscal Compact of the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) calls for independent fiscal institutions at the national level to monitor compliance with the rules there set in paragraph 1 of Article 3.²² Namely, it prescribes that “Progress towards, and respect of, the medium-term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the revised Stability and Growth Pact.” Whenever significant observed deviation from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it is observed, a correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically at the national level. The respective national IFI is involved in such correction mechanism at the national level.

As a result of the Fiscal Compact, and also of the Six-Pack, namely of the Directive on national fiscal frameworks, many Euro-area countries have transposed into their national legislation the EB. Since the national IFI must monitor the compliance with the numerical rules set at the national level, in such cases it must assess compliance with the EB. However, the creation of the EB in 2011 preceded the consideration of national IFIs in the EU fiscal framework and no amendment to it was made: as argued before, the EB

²²The same role for IFIs is given also by [Regulation \(EU\) No 473/2013](#).

calculation is defined by the European Commission and must use Commission's data for year t from the Spring Forecast made in year $t+1$ on NAWRU, DRM, EU funds. The estimates for the structural balance (necessary to calculate the convergence margin) and for the potential output are also from the Commission, but from the SF of year $t-1$.²³

Given the aforementioned discretion in the estimate for DRMs by the Commission and the lack of transparency in the process, together with the usual revisions in the output gap components (NAWRU) used for year t (from the Autumn Forecast in November of year t to the Spring Forecast in May of year $t+1$), and the difficulty in obtaining real-time accurate data on EU funds it is very challenging for a national IFI to assess compliance with the requirements on the expenditure net of DRM, set in national legislation and in the TSCG, before the Commission assessment in May $t+1$. Yet, if the assessment of the national IFI is to be meaningful, it must be made before or at the same time as the Commission. Doing it afterward, or even after the ECOFIN Council assessment and just reproduce the international assessment, does not add value to the process nor to the national appropriation of fiscal rules. Diverging ex-post from such assessment does not seem to be possible since the several steps in the calculation of the EB foreseen in the SGP are based on the mentioned Commission's data and definition. Yet, when the assessment is made before the Commission, given that the threshold for a significant deviation is just a deviation of 0.5 p.p. of GDP there is a considerable risk of reaching a different conclusion just on the account of outdated data, which is difficult to explain, and consequently potentially costly for the reputation of the IFI.²⁴

Naturally, when there is a divergence between the structural balance evolution and the EB analysis, the national IFI can reach a different conclusion from the Commission or the ECOFIN on whether or not a significant deviation exists and publicly communicate that to the public. It involves a communication challenge, and its practical impact regarding triggering the automatic correction mechanism depends on national legislation provisions. Notwithstanding, it is very hard to communicate a divergence originated in a net expenditure deviation from requirements, due to the complexity of the EB.

In short, to be of use for IFIs, the calculation of the expenditure benchmark should be simplified and made more transparent.²⁵ If the unobservable elements such as DRM and NAWRU are to be kept in the calculation (and not previously "frozen") it would be necessary to involve the respective IFI in its estimation, increasing the transparency of the process. It is also essential to improve the timeliness of the data on expenditure financed by the EU budget.

²³ To improve predictability, differently from other variables, the potential output data and the convergence margin are frozen using data from the Spring Forecast for year t made in May $t-1$.

²⁴ The e-book by (Debrun & Beetsma, 2018) and (Kopits, 2013) include significant contributions on the role of IFIs in different fiscal frameworks and the challenges such novel institutions face in practice.

²⁵ It should be mentioned that after the publication of the Commission's assessment, IFIs have access to the calculation of the EB on the so-called "transparency files", but without the breakdown of the DRM considered.

6 Conclusions

Several EU fiscal framework reform proposals focus on one anchor and one or some operational rules. It is the case of the proposals by the (European Fiscal Board, 2018, 2019), (Kopits, 2018), (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018) or (Darvas et al., 2018) and others. Among the authors who believe in fiscal rules to constrain and guide discretionary fiscal policymaking, it is consensual that such rules should be as transparent and simple as possible, while at the same time being smart enough in order not to induce procyclical policies and to ensure effectiveness – their targets should be as far as possible under the control of the Government.

Common to many of such proposals is the preference for the net expenditure growth as the operational rule (with some nuances).²⁶ However, as this paper shows, the EB in its present form is not the “silver bullet” for the simplification of the EU fiscal framework. Although the structural balance rule was heavily criticised for relying too much on non-observable variables, the EB cannot be a replacement for that rule as in its calculation it is necessary to determine if the Member State’s structural balance is at its respective MTO to further calculate and apply the calibrated convergence margin that defines if the net expenditure modified aggregate can increase at a pace in line or below the medium-term potential output growth. Due to the non-observable components necessary to its calculation, the EB does not qualify as an operational rule under the direct control of the Government. To start with, the budget process in EU countries is not based on the ESA2010 national accounts definition of expenditure, as many countries still follow cash accounting. This makes it difficult to monitor possible deviations from planned expenditure during the year. Furthermore, revisions in the non-observable components of the EB could by themselves lead to unforeseen deviations, including the final figures on DRM.

The 2011 EB did not consider the existence of IFIs operating at the national level, which were added to the European fiscal framework just in 2013. The methodology used to calculate the EB is completely reliant on data and the judgement from the European Commission based on national authorities reporting. IFIs have no privileged access to such data before publication, and the process is not sufficiently transparent. Therefore, for the EB to become an operational rule, and for the national IFIs to have a significant role in monitoring compliance as required by the legislation and the TSCG, its calculation should be much simplified, made more transparent, and formally involving the IFIs in the calculation of the several inputs required. It is also urgent to improve the data reporting to enable a real-time knowledge of the flows of EU funds, which are also essential to the calculation, and will likely increase as a response to the current crisis. All these adjustments would improve compliance and enforceability.

Therefore, this contribution argues in favour of an increase in transparency, the involvement of national IFIs in the calculation of unobservable variables (including the

²⁶ Back in 2016, Buegel’s contribution to the reform of the EU fiscal framework by (Claeys et al., 2016) advocated several corrections to the EB to become a public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback.

DRM), and the simplification of this benchmark. The precise way to simplify this indicator will depend on the options adopted in the overall reform of the EU fiscal rules, namely in what regards the role of the structural balance rule. If the structural balance rule is to be retained, then one possibility would be to minimize the inconsistencies between the two indicators redefining some building blocks of the EB or the SBB, such as the treatment of investment, the relevant potential GDP, and the cyclical adjustment. If, on the contrary, the structural balance rule is to be abandoned, then the EB could also get rid of the unobservable variables, potential GDP and NAWRU. Another possibility is a mix of the two options, keeping the SBB and base the EB just on observable variables, further decoupling the two indicators, however at the cost of increasing the opportunities for Governments to “pick-and-choose” the preferred indicator.

The existence of effective national IFIs allows also for a more radical reform letting the operational rules be defined at the national level, anchored in proper Medium-Term Budget Frameworks (MTBF) and just retain higher level rule(s) at the supranational level, *e.g.* a reformed debt rule.

Annex: conciliation between the SBB and the EB

Based on (Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, 2015), one way to show the link between the EB and the SBB is to consider the total differential of the structural deficit ($SDEF$) to potential GDP (Y) ratio:

$$d\left(\frac{SDEF}{Y}\right) = \frac{d(SDEF)}{Y} - \frac{SDEF}{Y}g, \quad (4)$$

where g is the potential GDP growth rate. Since the structural deficit is, by definition, equal to total structural expenditure less structural revenue (R), and the total structural expenditure could be divided into structural primary expenditure (PE) and interest payments (rB), where r is the implicit rate on debt (B), then:

$$SDEF = PE + rB - R. \quad (5)$$

Using (5) we can rewrite (4) as:

$$d\left(\frac{SDEF}{Y}\right) = \frac{d(PE)}{Y} - \frac{PE}{Y}g + \frac{d(rB)}{Y} - \frac{rB}{Y}g - \frac{dR}{Y} + \frac{R}{Y}g. \quad (6)$$

Taking into account that:

$$d\left(\frac{R}{Y}\right) = \frac{d(R)}{Y} - \frac{R}{Y}g \quad (7)$$

and

$$d\left(\frac{rB}{Y}\right) = \frac{d(rB)}{Y} - \frac{rB}{Y}g, \quad (8)$$

the previous expression (6) can be rewritten as:

$$d\left(\frac{SDEF}{Y}\right) = \frac{d(PE)}{Y} - \frac{PE}{Y}g + d\left(\frac{rB}{Y}\right) - d\left(\frac{R}{Y}\right), \quad (9)$$

which when solved for $d(PE)/Y$ and dividing both terms by PE/Y yields:

$$\frac{d(PE)}{PE} = g + \frac{d(SDEF/Y)}{PE/Y} + \frac{d(R/Y) - d(rB/Y)}{PE/Y}. \quad (10)$$

Now it is possible to compare this expression with the formula used by the EB which requires that the modified (primary) expenditure aggregate net of one-offs and DRM (mg_t) grows at a pace in line with the reference medium-term potential growth (\bar{g}) less the convergence margin. The convergence margin is given by the required annual adjustment in the structural balance expressed in percentage points of GDP ($adjustment_t$) divided by the observed primary balance (PE^{obs}) to GDP ratio in the previous year, yielding:

$$mg_t = \bar{g} - \frac{adjustment_t}{PE_{t-1}^{obs}/GDP_{t-1}} \quad (11)$$

When the Member State concerned is not yet at the respective MTO, the SBB should show, as a general rule, an annual improvement by at least 0.5% of potential GDP. In practice, this requirement is conditional on the state of the economy, calling for a larger improvement when in “good times” and high debt, and a smaller improvement or even no improvement at all when in “bad times”. The precise figure on the required adjustment, *i.e.* the required annual improvement in the structural balance ($SDEF_t^{req}$) is given by a matrix of requirements, published in the SGP Code of Conduct, which takes into account the debt level and the economic cycle:

$$adjustment_t = -d(SDEF_t^{req}/Y_t), \quad (12)$$

which means that we could rewrite the EB requirement (11) as:

$$mg_t = \bar{g} - \frac{-d(SDEF_t^{req}/Y_t)}{PE_{t-1}^{obs}/GDP_{t-1}}. \quad (13)$$

Expression (13) can then be compared with (10) to show the link between the two indicators.

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